A Summary of what has happened in Divorce Law
since 1970
ADRIAN J.G. PELLMAN, LL.B. SOLICITOR London,
September 2, 1998 Mr. Adrian Pellman, solicitor.
Pellman's 1st Floor Suite, 1 Abbey Street,
Eynsham. Oxford. 0X6 1HR. Tel:01865-884400.
Fax: 01865-8844.
Dear client
You asked me to set out shortly, for your meeting
with (name), a summary of what has happened in Divorce
Law since 1970, to lead to the present state of affairs.
Essentially, what has happened is that the Courts
have virtually turned the Law upside down, contrary
to the express intention of Parliament, and created
a situation whereby people can break up marriages and
obtain the same financial benefits as would only have
been received had the other party broken up the marriage.
Since actions may be taken without consequences, there
is no incentive to refrain from those actions.
Prior to 1970, the position was quite simple. Divorce
could only effectively be obtained for cruelty (i.e.
very unreasonable behaviour causing injury to health),
desertion or adultery. There was no liability in law
to maintain the other party if they deserted, or if
a Court had found them guilty of cruelty or adultery.
This was a very real constraint in that somebody who
was bored with their marriage had to consider the consequences.
If they walked out they lost their maintenance. They
therefore had to make a value judgment as to what to
do.
Parliament, in passing the 1969 Divorce Reform Act.,
which became the 1970 Act, and is now the 1973 and 1984
Acts, made absolutely clear its intentions, as shown
in the House of Commons Committee Report from the Bill.
What Parliament contemplated was the following
1. Cruelty would
be replaced by unreasonable behaviour to deal with the
common situation of somebody who was subject to cruel
behaviour but was not affected in their health.
2. Those who wished
to bury their marriage by agreement without proving
the matrimonial offence could do so on the basis of
two years separation and Parliament clearly contemplated
that that would be in the vast majority of cases. This
was in fact not so.
3. Those who formerly
could not obtain a divorce because they had no grounds
could enforce a divorce after five years separation
provided proper financial provision was made for the
innocent party.
The conduct provision remained, so that if a party
had committed cruelty or adultery they could not expect
to be maintained, and he common law rule that a party
in desertion had no right to claim maintenance also
was unaffected. An attempt was made by he "Reformers
to overturn this in the Committee stage but it at failed.
The Courts proceeded to turn this upside down. The
language of the Act in relation to conduct was virtually
the same as it had been since the 1857 Act, and there
had been no changes by way of developments in case law
which altered in any way the statement of the law that
I have set out above. Notwithstanding this, the Courts
made two fundamental changes in he Law which have brought
about the wave of divorce.
The first of these was to apply a subjective and
not an objective test to unreasonable behaviour, so
that behaviour which the average man or woman would
not regard as unreasonable was treated as unreasonable
if the party claiming it said that they found it unreasonable.
This opened a floodgate of petitions n grounds which
Parliament never contemplated, and this round became
by far the most popular ground for divorce whereas it
had been the least used (under the name of cruelty)
before he 1970 Act.
The Courts were supported by the Law Society n this,
which proceeded to grant legal aid to bring contested
divorces but to refuse legal aid to those who had defended
upon the ground that the marriage must have broken up
or there would not be a petition. If Parliament had
intended divorces not to be defended it would have provided
for them not to be defended. Effectively the Courts
brought in divorce on demand in express defiance of
Parliament.
The second development was a 1974 case in which it
was held that 'conduct' was no longer relevant unless
it was "gross and obvious" and effectively
the Courts rarely hold any conduct to be relevant, or
if they do, pay lip service to it and otherwise ignore
it. If the wife broke up the marriage the Courts would
treat her in a way as if it had been her husband who
had broken up the marriage. Whereas, if the husband
did break up the marriage, he could rely upon being
treated with greater harshness.
The other subsidiary development was that the Courts
announced that they would not enforce their own access
Orders. The affect was rather like saying that in future
burglars would not be prosecuted. You get a wave of
burglaries. The specious ground for this was that if
the custodial parent was upset the child would be upset.
You might say to the contrary that the image to the
child not seeing the non custodial parent would be much
more serious.
We tried to keep this as short as possible. Essentially
what it boils down to is that:
The Courts have quite willfully frustrated the intentions
Parliament. I was actually present at a seminar when
the 1984 Act, which was supposed to have altered things,
had just been produced and an eminent Barrister said
that "it was the opinion of the judiciary that
nothing should change". Just as courts had turned
the 1970 Act upside down they simply denied the spirit
of the 1984 Act.
Since the Courts take the view that wives may break
up their marriage without any consequence, it is not
surprising there is more of divorce. My own observation
of the "unreasonable demeanor petition" is
that the vast majority are thoroughly bad and reflect
no more than boredom with the marriage and more so the
majority of cases what triggers off the divorce is the
arrival of the boyfriend hidden in the background.
Sincerely.
ADRIAN J.G. PELLMAN, LL.B. SOLICITOR
CHAPTER 2: THE DIVORCE LEGISLATION OF 1971-1996.
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT.
Chapter 2 by: Adrian Pellman, a practicing solicitor.
Pellman's 1st Floor Suite, 1 Abbey Street, Eynsham.
Oxford. 0X6 1 HR. Tel:01865-884400. Fax: 01865-8844.
Introduction.
As a divorce practitioner with many years experience
I find that most clients come to me in a state of total
bewilderment and astonishment over what happens to them
in divorce proceedings.
Injustice in Secret Courts
What astonishes them is the perceived injustice,
the abandonment of any generally recognized principles
of justice and morality, and (lie hostility Co men,
which characterize the divorce courts. The bewilderment
results from a widespread lack of public understanding
- until themselves involved - in the way in which the
Divorce Courts (not the weasel words 'Family Courts"
for courts winch exist to break up families) have, over
the past 25 years, deviated from the laws as Parliament
intended and expected them to be applied, and from the
generally held views of men and women as to justice
and fair play.
This bewilderment is found whatever the degree of
education of the client. Its prime cause is the conspiracy
of silence in which only a distorted and limited picture
emerges from the closed doors behind which matrimonial
cases are heard - in secret courts such as have not
been seen in Britain since the days of the Star Chamber.
Behind closed doors, and with closed eyes and ears,
the legal and social work professions operate in an
"invented world", where it is assumed that
their actions arc fair and just, and will be so regarded
and approved of by right-minded people, and the general
public. it also results from the approach of the media,
who tend to accept without question the smooth and misleading
picture put to them by the lawyers and social workers
and, with a few honourable exceptions tend to suppress
any alternative view.
This deviation from justice began with the 1969 Divorce
Reform Act and the 1970 Matrimonial Proceedings and
Property Act. For a number of years pressures had built
up from various influential quarters for what was described
as 'reform" of the divorce laws. The public and
Parliament were sold the idea that there were many people
who could not obtain divorces although they had lived
apart for many years, who ought to be free to do so,
and many others who wanted a divorce without the need
to allege a matrimonial offence against the other. This
seemed just on the face of it. just, which was why there
was so little opposition to proposals for change.
The Church of England further muddied the waters
by its call for easier divorce but with an inquest into
the causes of each marital breakdown. The divorce activists,
working to a hidden agenda, used the Church to gain
its support, but made sure it got something very different
from what you hoped for.
The Activists for 'Reform"
Among those most actively pushing for changes in
the divorce laws principally the divorce lawyers and
senior judges, and the upper intellectual and professional
classes, there were a range of motives but among the
lawyers particularly, a hidden agenda. The intellectual
and professional class, as in many other fields, suffered
from the bizarre belief that, if the machinery of conflict
were removed or minimized, people would resolve their
differences in a civilized mariner.
Tame (1) wrote in the 19th Century that the principal
cause of the French Revolution had been that the governing
classes were moved, above all oilier things by an extreme
horror of conflict and violence, and preferred the lives
of maniacs and malefactors to the maintenance of order.
Corelli Bamett (2) wrote a few years ago that the
educated classes of Britain not only thought the world
ought to be a place where civilized people settled their
differences over tea in the drawing room, a noble ideal,
but in an extraordinary delusion really thought it was
such a place,. They believed, and still profess to believe,
that if the causes of divorce and the parties behaviour
were excluded from discussion conflict and bitterness
would cease They entirely failed to realize that people
in marital conflict are fighting over the most important
matters in their lives, their children, and all they
have worked for, and that such fundamental issues can
usually only he resolved by conflict. They also failed
to realize that there is no greater bitterness than
that caused by injustice. In a word, they thought that
weapons cause war, not that war causes weapons, and
failed to understand that most people of any spirit
prefer conflict to submitting to injustice.
The Naiveté of the Educated Classes
On the whole, the educated classes, except where
they themselves have been involved in divorce, still
naively believe they have a civilized divorce law, and
the serious press is constantly full of letters from
well-meaning people who say that those in divorce need
sympathy and help in "fairly distributing their
property and helping the children?. They fail to realize
that for the bulk of the population there is not enough
property to distribute, fairly or otherwise, and that
all, whether rich or poor regard their property as theirs
and not something to be taken from them or as one eminent
judge described it, "redistributed within the family?.
A woman solicitor even wrote to the legal press saving
we should develop a system in which all Court Orders
were Consent Orders! This is the fear of conflict of
which Tame wrote. In the real world, however, two nations
who wanted the same piece of land fought for it, and
in the domestic sphere two people who wanted the same
house or custody of the same children also do. This
is blindingly obvious to all but the "civilized"
classes. People in the real world continue to believe
that it is 'their" child and 'their? house, and
will not accept that the Olympian disposal of their
child and house to someone else is some how "fair"
and thus to be meekly accepted with a pat on the back
from the social workers. In the invented world of the
lawyers and social workers, however, the holding of
such views is seen as mad or bad or both, and is guaranteed
to incur judicial hostility. I have even heard one woman
lawyer say how much she admired the 'moderation and
reasonableness" of men who voluntarily gave up
all contact with their children because their wife objected
to it.
What I suspect underlies the desire of the lawyers
the social workers and the 'well meaning classes to
avoid conflict in divorce is the delusion that their
anti-male attitudes are shared by the general public
and that, if the machinery of conflict were somehow
removed everybody would happily accept the diktats of
the divorce courts.
Behind the scenes were other forces, most strongly
represented in the legal and social science professions,
who had a fanatical belief in feminism in the widest
sense. They wanted a system in which women had no obligations
or duties in marriage, but unqualified rights regardless
of conduct. I well remember being told by a lady barrister
in a well known divorce chambers that most of the men
in her chambers, Eton and Oxford types, considered that
any woman who married however briefly, should he entitled
to be kept in comfort for the rest of her life without
working, regardless of her conduct. The rise of this
element, always strong among the lawyers, was compounded
by the growth since the war, as a result of widespread
university education, of a large art graduate intelligentsia,
whose views on social and moral issues had come to depart
radically from those held by the general public.
The Debate in Parliament
All these various elements made their big effort
in the House of Commons Committee stage of the 1970
Act when they attempted to have conduct deleted as an
issue in maintenance and capital orders. Until then
the law had been clear for generations, adultery desertion,
and cruelty were a bar to any claim of maintenance and
therefore a heavy deterrent to breaking a marriage.
If a woman was "bored" with her marriage,
or 'fancied" somebody else, or "needed space",
she had to make a value judgment before breaking up
her marriage. Was it so unacceptable that she was prepared
to forgo the financial benefits? The Committee threw
this out with great firmness and a reading at the records
of the Committee in the House of Commons is a salutary
exercise. The Committee thought outrageous that conduct
should be irrelevant, and pointed out that such move
would only lead to widespread divorce and injustice.
One other move by the "reformers as I shall
now call them, was also defeated, although actually
introduced by the government a statutory requirement
for the courts to seek by financial orders, to maintain
the financial position of the wife only, but not that
of the husband. The 'reformers" had been defeated.
But this defeat was short lived.
The 1970 -73 Legislation
The 1970 Divorce Act preserved conduct, and the only
significant chance in that respect was that cruelty
as a ground for divorce was replaced by unreasonable
behaviour, the difference being that the element of
injury to health was no longer required. There was no
suggestion in Parliament that the test of acceptable
behaviour should change.
Further legislation followed in the form of the Matrimonial
Causes Act of 1973 that was, in many ways, a consolidating
Act for the 1970 Act, and the associated legislation
that had taken place immediately before and after it.
These Acts had answered the pressures of the 'reformers
by adding two additional grounds to the existing three
grounds for divorce The existing three had been adultery,
desertion, and cruelty (i.e. behaviour plus injury to
health). The two additional grounds were: two years
separation in the case of consent by both parties to
divorce, or five years separation if one parties did
not consent. The two years separation plus consent ground
catered for the more sensitive elements of the educated
classes who, in the case of genuine mutual consent,
were repelled by divorce petitions containing allegations
against the other party and wanted to do everything
"by consent?. The five years separation ground
catered for those caught in the position where they
could never obtain a divorce for lack of grounds. It
was quite apparent that Parliament contemplated three
classes of divorce:
- A compulsory divorce
after five years separation,
- A consensual divorce
after two years separation in which people could
make their own arrangements, and
- A non-consensual divorce
where one party did not want a divorce, or in the
case of adultery, desertion unreasonable behaviour
(i.e. cruelty, without the need to prove injury
to health). It was naively anticipated that most
divorces would be by consent. This never proved
to be the case. The financial provisions rested,
as to the criteria for making orders, on a more
detailed reiteration of the provisions, based on
conduct, which had been in the original 1857 Divorce
Act. The courts had to make such order as was just
"having regard to the parties? conduct."
Parliament's Intentions Frustrated
The excesses of the reformers had apparently been
frustrated by Parliament, but the Courts proceeded immediately
to undermine Parliament's intentions in a devastating
manner. First, they ruled that the test of unreasonable
behaviour was subjective as opposed to objective, so
that conduct which an ordinary reasonable person would
find insufficiently unreasonable to justify divorce
was nevertheless to be held sufficient if the petitioner
claimed to find it so (3). This opened the gates to
the ridiculously weak "behaviour" petitions
of the past twenty years, and led to a widespread practice
of anybody (particularly a man) who sought to defend
a weak "behaviour" petition being subjected
to hostile assault by judges. In addition, such litigants
received extreme pressure from their own banisters and
solicitors, who would tell them that there was no purpose
in defending, since the marriage had broken down. Legal
aid was usually refused although sometimes granted to
women. The Courts themselves, in defiance of Parliament,
had brought about the "divorce on demand"
which most of the lawyers and academics favored.
The Removal of Conduct
The second and fatal step was for the Family Division
in the case of Wachtel (4) to hold that conduct was
usually irrelevant in the case of financial matters.
This was only partially stalled by the Court of Appeal,
which ruled that conduct was relevant if it was gross
and obvious. Soon afterwards, the Court of Appeal, differently
constituted, held in the case of Rogers (5) that the
Wachtel decision was plainly wrong and contrary to the
expressed intention of Parliament. This decision, although
it appeared in the law reports, was virtually kept out
of the legal press, and most lawyers are unaware of
it. Wachtel was followed by the courts, and not Rogers,
although each were of equal authority. This was a period
in which the legal press tended to give great publicity
to the views of those who supported the anti-conduct
trends, and to ignore the views of those who opposed
them. We now know from the recent memoirs of a Judge
that this decision resulted from a private meeting of
the Judges who decided this policy approach in secret,
over twenty years ago. This revelation has received
little publicity beyond an admiring comment in The Times,
which seemed to fail to realize what it was saying.
In practice it became rare for the courts to find anything
'gross and obvious? or on the fairly rare occasions
when it did, to do anything about it. Judicial hostility
to raising conduct, at least against wives, became the
norm. Finally the Courts abandoned the age old rule
that a deserting wife was not entitled to maintenance.
The Courts were required under Section 25 of the
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973 to put the parties in
the some position as prior to the divorce so far as
possible having regard to their conduct", and in
doing so to consider a number of factors including that
of "need". However, despite Parliament having
thrown out the reformers attempts to have "need"
apply specifically to wives only, "need" became
the only consideration that the Courts took seriously.
'Need was interpreted as meaning getting wife absolute
security to the extent that this could be squeezed out
of the husband. Whereas, the widow of a Falklands war
hero was left to a meager pension, the adulterous wife
was showered with sympathy and held to be entitled to
the utmost security for the rest of her life. As shown
in Wachtel, the orders of the court were made "without
having regard to their conduct," In direct contravention
of the Act. The Courts ignored all other statutorily
required considerations that involved merit as distinct
from need, and in so doing ignored all considerations
of justice, "need being the only consideration
that involves no "merit".
A common approach was to give the wife (and her boyfriend)
the house on the grounds that they "needed"
it to bring up the husband's children. In contrast the
husband without wife or children was then told that
a bed-sitter met his needs.
The "Weak" Behaviour Petition
The net effect of these developments was to create
a pattern in which spouses, mainly wives, brought weak
behaviour petitions when they became bored with their
husbands or found somebody else. Husbands were then
pressured not to defend themselves and found they were
stripped of their assets and children by hostile Courts
applying a quasi-Marxist interpretation of 'need and
a Court of Appeal determined to decide any question
in favour of the wife if it possibly could, under the
leadership of the same judge who had decided the Wachtel
case before it went to appeal.
The Ousting of Husbands from the Home
The "reformers had thus succeeded in fooling
Parliament into passing legislation and then using that
legislation to achieve the very opposite of what Parliament
had intended, without the public ever being aware until
it hit them, and usually not even then. The situation
was reinforced and worsened by the domestic violence
legislation, coupled with an extremely wide interpretation
of its provisions. The Courts made use of a claimed
inherent jurisdiction to oust husbands at the slightest
pretext, the commonest one being that the wife suffered
distress husband to arrive at court to Find his own
barrister pressing him to leave those lawyers, like
myself, who came along and announced that the husband
was not leaving, found themselves the subject of the
most indignant and outraged pressure from courts and
wives' lawyers alike.
The Courts Held to Be Acting Without Lawful
Authority
Significantly, in 1984, in the case of Richards (6),
the House of Lords held that the Courts had wrongly
assumed an inherent jurisdiction arid had been issuing
ouster orders for many years without, in many cases,
any lawful authority whatsoever. Ouster became much
less frequent after that with considerable restrictions
being placed on it by the Courts. The bulk of ouster
cases I encountered for some years were ones where the
pressure came not from the Court, but from the husband's
own lawyers. The situation has gradually resumed to
the pie-Richards position and the l990 Act, with its
absence of references to justice, is highly likely to
worsen the position, as most judges are eager to restore
the Richards position of ouster on wife's demand, Indeed,
the recent case of the Portsmouth headmaster, ousted
from his home, is likely to be the precursor of many
more.
Public Bewilderment
All of these developments took place without being
realized or understood outside the ranks of those involved
in divorce, and it was widely assumed that divorce was
as it had been but merely easier to obtain. Those involved
in divorce did not really realize what had hit them
until it did. Many could not believe what had happened
to them, let alone understand it.
Bizarre Processes of Reasoning
In order to justify their approach, bizarre processes
of reasoning were adopted by the Court, which an eminent
student of those developments, Dr John Campion, has,
as part of the wider picture, summarized in the phrase
'the invented world. By this he meant a world in which
the weird views of the "family? lawyers and social
workers were regarded as the only normal approach to
human relations, so that anyone who objected to being
stripped of their home, property and children, in a
way they would not be if they had committed a grave
crime, was assumed to be mad or bad. It was a world
in which it was normal, right and proper that men who
had committed no crime could be stripped of everything,
in which the Courts refused to enforce their own orders
against wives if they chose not to obey them, in which
it was "in the best interest of the family"
for children to be deprived of their fathers, and to
see their fathers stripped and humiliated, and in which
husbands/fathers were not only expected to work to support
or at least house their former spouses living with their
Children and a new lover, but actually regarded as mad
or bad if they raised any objection. There was no hesitation
about throwing them into prison if they did not comply
with the Court's order. It was a world in which several
very senior judges proclaimed that there was no significance
in the "blood tie" between father and child,
but only in that between mother and child.
Bogus Principles of Social Behaviour
A number of quite extraordinary principles of social
behaviour were put forward by the cowls to justify their
reasoning, in response to the sense of moral outrage
that began to develop among the public. A bizarre view
was put forward by the judges that the husband was the
"cock out feathering his nest while the wife was
sitting at home on the nest,? and that the husband could
not have feathered his nest were the wife not sitting
on it. This has been uncritically repeated throughout
the legal profession and the law reports, although even
momentary examination reveals it to be manifestly) absurd.
The man who has regularly worked would, in most cases,
have acquired his property, whether married or not.
A possible exception is in the case of the man pushed
on by an ambitious wife, but then for every man pushed
on by an ambitious wife there is likely to be one held
back by an unambitious one. Indeed, it should further
be pointed out that the wives who have acquired houses
and property would, had they not married, have been
unlikely to acquire such property, or even own any property,
because of the lower pay of women.
Injustice Better than Conflict
It was argued that, by stripping husbands of their
property without investigating the causes of the marital
breakdown, Courts were sparing the parties the distress
of conflict and the bitterness which would have resulted
from that conflict. If the victim protested, or expressed
bitterness at being "stripped,? or pointed out
that it was being "stripped" rather than conflict
to which he objected, judges regarded and treated him
as mad or bad. The lawyers would patronizingly boast
that they had spared the husband the distress of a Court
battle by stripping him at the courtroom door.
Willful Confusion of Reasoning
It was said that relationships broke down for complex
reasons, and that the Courts could not investigate these
reasons in depth. Often true, but irrelevant. What should
matter, and to the ordinary member of the public did
matter, was who broke up the marriage and that they
had objectively substantial reasons, not what the feelings
were in a relationship. If this were not so then in
the eyes of the Courts, marriage as an institution,
is of less importance than other relationships, including
cohabitation. It is the contract of marriage, and its
breach, upon which Parliament intended the courts to
adjudicate, not a 'relationship'.
The Underlying Prejudice Against Men
The reality was that the Courts did not wish to investigate
the facts, mainly because investigation might reveal
matters adverse to the wife, and partly from an Olympian
distaste for conflict. The same factors were involved
in the reluctance of the Courts to hear the views of
children as to where they wished to reside. They might
hear what they did not want to hear, children saying
that they wished to live with their father. Again.,
it was said that it was best for the children to see
a difficult marriage broken up, and the wife in secure
accommodation, preferably with her new "man"
to form a new "family". Why the children should
benefit from losing a father, seeing him impoverished,
probably losing contact with him, and a decline in their
living standards, was not explained. It was only explicable
on the ground that the judicially and the bulk of the
legal and social work professions saw fathers as figures
of no significance. Indeed there many judges, and many
more lawyers, quite prepared to say that they were not
in the least concerned with what happened to the husband/father,
and often that the 'blood tie" between father and
child was of no significance. The Courts wholeheartedly
embraced this view, ruling that, when the parents divorced,
there is a new family consisting of the wife, children
and the new man. The old family, i.e., the husband,
had ceased to exist, except for maintenance, where the
courts did not hesitate to say that the husband "ought
to be supporting his family", even if not allowed
to see the same family of which the same courts no longer
regarded him as part.
New Principles to Justify Prejudice
The Courts justified their prejudice by developing
principles ad hoc, whenever they were necessary to place
the wife in a favorable position. If the property was
in joint names it was said that the wife was entitled
to her half, regardless of the merits and issues, because
her name was on the deeds, in accordance with the law
relating to land, whereas the husband was stripped of
his half share, despite his name being on the deeds,
on the grounds of the wife's "needs". The
"principle" which caused the greatest outrage
was that adultery by? wives could not be criticized
because "it took three to commit adultery"
- yet another absurd generality without foundation which,
significantly, applied only in favour of wives. I remember
being in the Court of Appeal, in a case in which a most
senior judge, then a household name, who had repeatedly
said that wives' adultery was of no consequence, remarked
"Your client [a man] has committed adultery".
My clients woman Counsel replied "Conduct is not
in issue", whereupon the Judge replied "I
am not saying conduct is in issue. I merely remarked
that your client has committed adultery". My client
then found himself going downhill, castigated for adultery,
with remarkable speed! Public outrage over these attitudes
became so widespread that a Lord Chancellor, in the
face of this public outrage over the exclusion of conduct,
started to talk about punishing adulterous husbands,
while making no apparent mention of punishing adulterous
wives at all.
New Judges - Increased Prejudice
These views persisted and intensified and the practices
which resulted became the subject of a rather sick joke
in the 1970's; men committed more crime than women because
the man who wanted £50,000 had to hold up a bank, whereas
the woman had only to take a man with £50,000 to the
Register Office.
Not only did those views persist but the new breed
of liberal judges upheld them much more vigorously.
The occasional maverick, brought up in a non 'family
law? background or in an older tradition of justice,
is dying out. We now have judges who have carried on
most of their career in the post-1970 environment. They
know nothing different; their attitudes generally are
such that it would not occur to them to challenge the
injustices which they daily administer, let alone to
see them as injustices and they are further inhibited
both by the general tendency of English lawyers to conform
and by the national tendency not to think too hard.
An illustration of the attitudes of the ear, from which
most judges are drawn, was contained in a recent article
in a law journal, where comment was made that it was
useful that solicitors could appear in the new Patent
County Court as barristers appeared to have "problems"
about cross-examining female witnesses.
Judges Provide Incentive to Divorce
Applied to everyday situations, all this meant that
the law as Parliament intended it pre-1974 had gone.
Prior to then, a wife who deserted her husband was disentitled
to maintenance at common law, and could be divorced
without maintenance after three years, and an adulterous
or cruel wife was divorced usually without maintenance
in none of these cases did she have a capital claim
against any property not hers in law. Until only a few
years before there had been no maintenance for the child
if with a mother in a state of desertion. This was a
powerful deterrent to desertion. Those who planned to
ditch their husband without good cause had to make a
value judgment. If they went off with the boyfriend
they received no maintenance and no capital. In the
new situation the judges said "if you want to ditch
your husband and take a boyfriend we will support you
and see that you do not lose out. You can have your
husband's money and your boyfriend." They then
proceeded to express surprise and even puzzlement at
the huge rise in the divorce rates, to become the highest
in Europe, without in the faintest degree seeing that
they were the cause. Those that did understand it seemed
not concerned. If easy divorce without consequences
was what women wanted, women should have it.
The Corrupting Effect of Injustice on the Lawyers
The development of judicial attitudes was accompanied
by a corresponding corrupting effect on the legal profession.
Judges who cease to do justice according to law, themselves
come to be indifferent to legal principles, and ordinary
principles of justice. Lawyers become similarly infected.
The basis of all professional relationships is a duty
to the client, the duty in the case of a lawyer being
to do his best on behalf of a client, impartially to
advise the client, and then to put the clients case
and wishes to the best of his ability, subject to the
general limits of professional conduct and keeping within
the law.
It soon became obvious that many divorce lawyers
(who began hypocritically to call themselves 'family
lawyers") were not acting in the interests of male
clients. Attitudes to male clients often ranged front
the openly hostile through the plausible sell-out approach
to hopeless defeatism. The quality of advice was frequently
poor, helpful case law frequently ignored, and serious
attempts to resist or answer claims were not frequently
made. A general attitude developed of find out what
she'll take and give it to her. So accustomed were wives
lawyers to meeting no resistance that I found that,
if resisted, they either treated the resistance as some
type of joke or pretense to impress the client, or exploded
with outrageous indignation. One significant consequence
of this was that fewer and fewer really able lawyers
did divorce work. The quality of divorce lawyers markedly
deteriorated.
The Effect on the Clients
The hostility of the judges, reinforced by the unwillingness
of lawyers to stand up to judges, and the prejudices
and failings of the lawyers led w clients frequently
not being advised of their rights or their case not
acme pressed in the Courts. What also happened was that
Courts often made orders quite beyond their powers if
they felt they could get away with it. That is to say,
if they felt the lawyers in front of them would do little
about it, as was usually the case. Such attitudes spread
throughout the profession to such an extent that some
firms in London boasted that "We only act for wives".
Solicitors at Law Society conferences called for lawyers
to cease to be obliged to act in their clients' interest
but, in a new and ominous phrase "to act in the
interests of the family". This was a code word
for acting in the interests of the wife, and has become
general usage among family lawyers. It became common
practice, particularly among barristers, for them to
get together and 'settle" the case usually to the
husband's disadvantage. The process of indoctrination
began at an early stage. Exam papers with a dozen questions
on Family Law contained as many as eleven saying "advise
the wife". The tendency of the Englishman not to
think had enabled a small and highly motivated minority
in brainwash a profession into unthinking acceptance
of its views.
The So-Called "Interests of the Family".
The absurdity of the expression "acting in the
interests of the family" is shown when one actually
examines it. The only person in Court who is there to
act in the interests of the family is the Judge. His
function is to do justice between the parties. This
is something which they now proudly boast of not doing,
saying their function is to protect the wife and children,
not to do Justice. The "family" clearly does
not include the father. The function of the lawyers
is to put forward the interests of their women not the
interests of the so-called 'family'. The other principal
member of which in any event will have another lawyer.
Indeed, the matter goes beyond that, since if the lawyers
"act in the interests of the family" as they
think they are doing, all they are doing is acting in
what they think are in the interests of the family.
They may be wrong, and thus do damage to the family.
The ultimate line became "putting the child first"
which really meant putting the mother first, and this
has become the all-embracing excuse for all manner of
injustice. Indeed, putting the child first appears to
have been the basis of the recently reported case of
in re: B (Times Law Report, 9th July,1997) in which
a father was barred from seeing his child after the
step father threatened to leave the mother if contact
were granted. This seems a questionable view of the
child's interests, since continued contact with its
father would seem of more importance than any short
term distress of the mother caused by departure of the
stepfather; indeed this law appears to regard fatherhood
as of no great significance.
Public Outrage
Increasing public outrage led, by 1979, to the formation
of organizations such as Campaign for Justice in Divorce.
Vigorous bombardment of the Press and Parliament began
to lead to awareness of something being wrong, even
though the precise nature of it was not understood.
The casualties of the matrimonial battlefield appeared
in social gatherings like disabled men after the First
World War. In l982 three hundred and fifteen MPs signed
a motion to investigate the position. The pressure for
change became so intense that the legal establishment
decided that something had to be done. What happened
though was that then effectively seized control of the
legislation and through skillful selection of the Committee,
and vigorous control of the voting in Parliament, ensured
that Parliament never really understood what was being
complained about and, what went through was relatively
innocuous. The establishment skillfully conned Parliament
and was disastrously helped by many of the leaders of
the insert's organizations, who went along with what
was happening apparently jollied along by the civil
servants involved.
The Failure of the First Men's Organizations: the
Conduct Issue
In my view it was an unfortunate feature of those
attempting to end the abuses that they failed to accept
that, in order to get public opinion going with them,
they would have to accept that middle aged and elderly
ladies could not be seen to be left for young women
and not provided for. This was a major cause of the
failure of the husbands groups to achieve wider support.
Because the husbands groups failed to push the "conduct?
issue, which was the cause of most outrage among ordinary
people, and campaigned instead for the total ending
of all maintenance, they alienated a larger body of
public opinion which would not support this. I cannot
over-emphasize that conduct is the key to everything
because conduct is the issue that outrages ordinary
people, and it is the abolition of conduct, together
with the various invented "principles of social
behaviour?, which has made divorce so easy and tempting
to wives, in essence, wives have been told by the Courts
that it is right and proper to say, "I don't want
him, but I want his money".
What Is Conduct?
What do I mean by conduct? The Courts will tell you
that they have not the time to go into nit-picking issues
of conduct and that, in any case usually one person
is as bad as another. The lack of time is a quite extraordinary
argument; because the implication is that the Courts
are far too busy doing injustice on a production line
scale to have the time to do justice on an individual
scale. But, importantly, conduct does involve nit-picking
issues. To most people, conduct means adultery, extreme
violence and desertion and similar matters. Neither
men nor women see why the adulterous or deserting wife
receives maintenance or is allowed to strip the husband
of his assets. More subtly, though, the real issue relating
to conduct is who brought an end to the marriage itself
and for what reason? Thus, if a wife breaks up a marriage
for no good reason, there is no reason why she should
receive maintenance other than her capital contribution
to the marriage. It is quite wrong that a wife should
be free to say she does not like her husband yet still
wishes to have his money.
The current approach to conduct is to exclude it
in nearly all cases, unless it is the man's conduct.
One other approach has been to limit conduct to the
consequences of financial misconduct e.g., dissipation
of assets, and then to top up the award so as to cancel
the effect of that conduct. This, at least on paper,
has been limited by the 1996 Act provisions which make
clear that conduct is not limited to financial misconduct,
in practice the courts are likely to ignore Parliament's
intentions, and lawyers will continue to reject conduct
as an issue.
The First Men's Organizations Collapse
The failure of the men's organizations to achieve
anything in the 1984 legislation, reinforced by their
leader's support of this useless legislation, led to
a decline in their membership for some years. Exemplifying
the tendency of men's organizations the world over to
split and even to litigate between themselves.
The Revival
By the 1990's the men's organizations were beginning
to revive under new leadership. The new organizations,
of which the United Kingdom Men's Movement was the most
significant, had a better grasp of what had happened
in the past, and had more defined policies on how to
deal with the problem. They understood the conduct issue
more clearly. I had written the original version of
this paper in 1988 to create an understanding, precisely
because I had watched the men's organizations for many
of whom I had acted, floundering in the dark, railing
against the system without understanding its causes.
I concluded that I needed to update it to meet the challenge
of the 1990's.
The Prospect of Change
So powerful however, had become the weight of the
establishment thinking in this field, combined with
a lack of public and Parliamentary understanding of
its cause - the lawyers - that the prospect of change
in the foreseeable future seemed low.
Change began to come from unexpected sources
The first was the increasing concern generally, and
in the academic field about the breakdown of the family
in this country. Second was the Government's desire
to save money on Legal Aid.
Social breakdown led to the increasing publication
of articles on the breakdown of the family and the injustices
in the Courts by outstanding writers such as Martin
Mears in the Sunday Telegraph, and other writers in
the Daily Mail. Only Martin Mears, however, grasped
the importance of the conduct issue and that the attitude
of the Courts and lawyers as the cause of the breakdown
of the family. The others tended to see the cause as
moral decline and the remedy as education in marriage
and the seeking of reconciliation in mediation. They
failed to realize that if you tell people that they
can dump their spouses, and still take their money,
all the social workers in the world will not hold them
back.
It might have taken many more years for these truths
to sink in, and the pressure to do something to develop,
but for the Government's desire to save money.
Here two factors came together, the Government wanted
to save money, and the family lawyers, and apparently
the lawyers who advised the Government, wanted to realize
their dream - divorce on demand. This led to the 1996
Family Law Act put forward by the Lord Chancellor.
The Government Proposal
The Lord Chancellor's proposals, in effect, were
for divorce on demand. mediators to solve the financial
issues and save Legal Aid money, and a widened power
of ouster which was to extend to cohabitees, thus reducing
marriage to mere cohabitation. Upon all the evidence,
much of the Cabinet did understand what was happening
and certainly did not want it, but a small and powerful
element did, and forced it through the Cabinet.
Parliament's Reaction
When Parliament, concerned by social breakdown, considered
the legislation, it, as a result of an outstanding campaign
by pro family campaigners, indicated that it was beginning
to understand a little of what had been happening. All
honors are due to the Daily Mail in particular for the
way it mobilized opposition so that a strong opposition
developed and the situation reached the point where
the legislation was threatened with failure. A desperate
Government made many concessions which for the first
lime may drive in beginnings of a wedge into the present
system. Despite us now having divorce on demand, conduct
is supposed to be taken into account to a greater degree
than in financial and child issues. It is my belief
that the Courts will continue to defy Parliament's intention.
I remember hearing a barrister, now a High Court Judge,
claim at a lecture on the 1984 Act that they would ignore
it. Nevertheless the continued social breakdown and
the further flagrant defiance by the Courts, of which
a wider public understanding is developing, will continue
to arouse further Parliamentary and media concern.
The Child Support Act
Another factor which had contributed to social breakdown
was the Child Support Act, sold to Parliament as a means
of saving the Exchequer from the cost of so-called "dead-beat
dads" who were not supporting their families, in
particular, the unmarried fathers.
It was later admitted by the Child Support Agency
chief that the real target, however, was the middle
class married father with means. In other words, once
again there was a hidden agenda.
The whole concept was fundamentally flawed from the
beginning. The burden of the Child Support Agency exactions
was so heavy that, for 95% of fathers, it would mean
working at subsistence level. If it be subsistence level
they might as well as give up work anyway. Indeed, if
they did carry on working, they would not be left with
sufficient means themselves to found a family. Thus,
a further under-class would be created of impoverished
men who could not afford to support a family, and of
women who, in consequence, could not find a husband
with whom to form a family. The obviousness of this
seemed entirely to elude the Government in so far as
it was concerned about it all. In reality, despite the
expenditure of nearly two billion pounds, the new Agency
has recovered far less than the DSS did under the old
liable relative system, and the position is worsening.
Two thirds of all persons who receiving a Child Support
Agency Assessment give up their employment within six
months. Every form of falsification of figures disguises
the non-recovery and arrears continue to rocket by hundreds
of millions every year. The cost in Social Security
for the men who have given up work is phenomenal. By
depriving men of the family, the incentive to work,
the system was accelerating the move to the matriarchal
society that now dominates the American inner cities
and many of our industrial areas - a world of unemployed
single fathers and of fatherless children running wild.
Feminists boast that Stone Age societies were matrilineal
- that is why they remained primitive.
The Pension Issue
One other development in recent years has been the
successive Acts of Parliament, first providing for maintenance
out of pension provision, and then (1996 Act) providing
for the pension to be treated as an asset and divided,
so that a wife who has remarried will many years later
be collecting a chunk of her ex husband's pension.
There is a false logic in the whole pension issue.
Pensions are being treated as a capital asset when they
are not. A pension is a contingent income dependent
on many factors. Splitting it could lead to the absurd
and unjust situation where; on retirement, the ex husband
has a proportion of his pension and his ex wife, by
now married to somebody else, has the rest of his pension
as well as her own and her "new" husband's.
Previously, the principle had been that pensions are
really only relevant if maintenance liability continued
beyond retirement age.
Once again the so called "reformers" had
pushed through Parliament a provision the implications
of which were not understood by MP's. Another encouragement
to easy divorce had been created.
The Solution
I wrote in 1988, and still hold, that the logical
consequence of any situation which sought justice was
that there should be three classes of divorce. The first
would be where the parties agree both to have a divorce
and on financial and related matters. The second would
be where one party that wanted a divorce for good and
substantial reason, such as grave misconduct by the
other party, i.e., adultery, desertion, or serious (in
the pre-1970 sense) behaviour, objectively assessed
as justifying termination of the marriage. The third,
and perhaps the great majority of cases, would be where
one-party-only wants a divorce, and could not show such
misconduct by the other party.
In the first case, no dispute would arise. In the
second, the payment of maintenance to the innocent party
would be appropriate in some cases, particularly where
the petitioner was a middle aged or elderly lady. In
the third case the party wanting the divorce should
effectively be put to their election. Either they continue
with the marriage and its obligations, or repudiate
the marriage and its obligations and thereby forego
the right to receive any financial benefit from the
marriage which they had unjustifiably broken up. "I
do not want him, but I want his money is a morally unacceptable
position (even prostitutes provide services for their
reward), and one which has led to Europe's highest divorce
rate. I have no doubt that if this approach were adopted
there would be a radical reduction in the number of
divorces. The "principle" invented by the
Courts, that both parties are at fault in the termination
of a marriage, results from a mixture of blind prejudice
and deliberate intellectual muddle, and has led to Courts
effectively determine marriage as a state in which the
wife should have no obligations of any kind yet should
have financial rights far greater than those of a widow,
regardless of her terminating the marriage for no good
reason. The justifiability of the termination of the
marriage should be the key issue. There is no reason
why someone should expect to break a contract arid still
benefit from it.
The Future
It is clear from the content of the debates in Parliament
that a substantial number of MP's are beginning to understand
what has happened. The change of Government and the
influx into Parliament of a mass of feminists and pro-feminists
strongly suggest, however, that only slow progress will
be made in this Parliament.
However, the first floodgate likely to collapse is
the Child Support Agency. Its ever increasing cost,
and decreasing recovery rate, plus the reported billion
plus bill to replace its computers, will make it increasingly
insupportable. It is also likely that litigation over
pensions will greatly increase the volume and bitterness
of litigants in the courts, and bring home the scale
of the disaster to more members of the public.
Getting the Truth to MPs
The only way forward is to get home to MPs the message
in this article which clearly sets out the true case
of the divorce disaster: the way the Courts have overridden
the intentions of Parliament and the way in which the
divorce lobby have conned Parliament and the media.
Laws to Override Judicial Prejudice
An essential aspect of any ultimate reform must be
to have laws drafted in sufficient detail that the Courts,
in their decisions, are unable to fly in the face of
the intentions of Parliament. Courts who are prepared
to order a man to maintain a wife who is living with
somebody else and see nothing wrong with this (7), or
to maintain an ex-wife from a short, childless marriage
who cannot work because she has become pregnant by another
man subsequent to a divorce (8), cannot be entrusted
with wide discretions.
Financial Orders: Fundamental Changes of Principle
There is considerable scope for the law on financial
entitlement to be far more clearly defined. In particular,
it is quite wrong for the Courts to act as if there
were an actual right to maintenance. There is no right
as such, either in common law or statute, only a right
to apply. This is as it should be. Maintenance should
then only be awarded to mothers while with young children
and to middle aged and elderly women, and then, only
if they have not broken up the marriage without good
reason. Equally, as a late 1980's Law Society paper
pointed out (9) there is no justification for matrimonial
courts, when dividing assets, to take away property
inherited or received from relatives or friends or owned
before the marriage. This outrageous aspect of present
practice, unique to the English Courts, amounts to giving
the Family Division a general power of appointment over
one's property, and is effectively taking money from
the divorced person's relatives.
Further Legislation Called For
I do not believe that it will be possible for those
who seek reform to achieve that reform through the gradual
development of cases in the Courts (which will be barred
by the defiance of the lawyers). Further legislation
is called for by stripping the courts of their wide
discretionary powers, and that legislation will not
be effective unless Members of Parliament actually under
stand the real issues and the part the Courts have played
in the social disintegration of our society.
References
1 Taine,
Hippolyte: The French Revolution.
2 Bamett,
C.: The Decline of British Power
3 i.e., the subjective
test
4 Wachtel v Wachtel,
1973
5 Rogers
v Rogers, 1 973
6 Richards
v Richards, 1984
7 Atkinson
v Atkinson, 1987
8 Wagner
v Wagner, 1978
9 Green,
D. Maintenance & Capital Provision on Divorce.
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